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This article challenges along two lines Milton Friedman's injunction that the sole 
role of the business manager is to maximize profits for shareholders using all legal 
and ethical means. First, it shows how Friedman overly narrows the manager's 
moral duties to consequentialist profit maximization and thereby fail s to account 
for a wide range of values and virtues necessary for good management. Second, it 
illustrates how more oblique approaches to management as we ll as Adam Smith's 
virtue-based model better capture the moral imagination and relational aspects 
of leadership that are critical to good management today. In the end, this article 
suggests that a subtler version of Friedman's directive should be considered in 
which maximizing shareholder wealth provides a powerful business goal but not 
an exclusive one to direct or to motivate managers. 
Milton Friedman promotes two doctrines in Capitalism and Freedom. The first is 
in regard to the proper role and use of corporate profits. The second is in regard 
to the moral foundations required for a stable society. Unfortunately, Friedman's 
doctrine on profit is often applied without reference to his second doctrine on 
ethics (James and Rassekh 2000). In a similar way, Adam Smith's economic 
injunctions in The Wealth of Nations are often misunderstood because the moral 
underpinnings for them in The Theory of Moral Sentiments are ignored. In both 
cases, an understanding of economic processes is weakened (Evensky 2005; 
Young I 997). This a1ticle analyzes the interconnections between the instrumen-
tal role of profits and the intrinsic role of morals in Friedman's model, using 
for its analytical framework the moral sentiments theory of Adam Smith. The 
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article also examines whether Friedman's profit-maximization goal adequately 
motivates managerial activity. 
The key problem with Friedman's mandate on profits is that it gives rise to 
a fundamental inconsistency: On one level, Friedman utilizes a largely conse-
quentialist ethic to explain how markets and economic actors behave, yet he 
simultaneously relies upon managers to uphold an intemal ethic based on duty 
and virtue. The psychological dissonance created may produce both hypocrisy 
and inefficiency. A subtler version of Friedman's injunction on profits and the 
manager is warranted, in which virtue ethics might provide a meaningful approach 
to motivation within the firm. 
The Manager and Profits 
Fiduciary Duties and Profit Maximization 
Milton Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom contains one of the twentieth 
century's most quoted economic passages: 
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the vel)' foundations of our free 
society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other 
than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible (1962, 133). 
He restates this claim in a widely reprinted article in the New York Times 
Sunday Magazine (1970). There, he makes two important points. First, he argues 
that, "(t)he corporation is an instrument of the stockholders who own it" (I 962, 
I 35). Managers are agent-employees of the owners and charged with conducting 
business in accordance with the owners' wishes. This typically is interpreted to 
mean that managers are to make as much money as possible for the owners and 
to avoid other activities that reduce shareholder profits. These other activities 
include acts of social responsibility that funnel profits to concerns other than 
those approved by stockholders. To do otherwise is, in Friedman's view, a form 
of unfair taxation. 1 
Friedman then makes an efficiency argument based on the instrumental role 
that profits play in a market system. In a free and competitive market lacking 
externalities, profits signal the way resources ought to be used in business to best 
meet the preferences of consumers. In this view, managers ought not to stand in 
the way of the market's free functioning and should not sidetrack the business 
by having it attend to social problems such as homelessness, unemployment, 
racial disparity, poverty, and so on . These are not the bailiwick of business nor 
is there anything in the manager's training that makes him or her expert in aiding 
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such causes. As Friedman notes: "If businessmen do have a social responsibility 
other than making maximum profits for stockholders, how are they to know what 
it is? Can self-selected private individuals decide what the social interest is?" 
(Ibid., 133).2 Clearly, Friedman thinks managers cannot. Instead, they should 
stick to what they do best and the job they are hired to perform: maximizing 
wealth creation for shareholders. As we will see, however, Friedman has added 
an important caveat that not only limits the manager's profit seeking but also 
coheres with the views of an earlier free-market proponent, Adam Smith. 
Caveats to Restrain Greed 
Although Friedman does claim that managers ought to strive to maximize 
profits for shareholders, he also maintains that doing so should not be divorced 
from the ethical foundations on which business activity takes place. Managers, 
he asserts, ought to maximize profits for owners while conforming to the "basic 
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom" ( 1970). Unbridled profit seeking is simply unacceptable behavior if such 
behavior is outside the mainstream of ethical norms. Managers may neither opt 
out nor excuse themselves from laws and customs. Instead, they must abide by 
what used to be called the basic "rules of justice." 
In adding this caveat, Friedman follows the lead of Adam Smith who argued 
forcefully against the notion that private vices are public virtues and against the 
belief that greed, avarice, and selfishness can contribute to public well-being 
(Calkins and Werhane 1998). In Smith 's view, people engaged in competitive 
commerce can be vittuous because their vittues-in particular, their habits of 
prudence, justice, and self-command-are crucial to a well-functioning society 
(ibid.). Virtuous people, Smith believed, will uphold "religiously the sacred rules 
of justice in spite both of the greatest interests which might tempt, and the greatest 
injuries which might provoke [them] to violate them" ( 1982, 241). In short, they 
will exercise self-command, Smith's preeminent individual vi1tue. 
For Smith, as for Friedman, self-interest is subsumed within an ethical frame-
work (James and Rassekh 2000). Smith states clearly that "in the race for wealth, 
and honours, and prefem1ents, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every 
nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should 
justle, or th.row down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at 
an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of' (J 982, 83). 
This ethical framework, which includes the notion of justice as fair play, is a 
social and ethical, not a legal, construct. lt is the platform on which character and 
reputation are forged: "To be anxious, or to be laying a plot either to gain or to 
save a single shilling, would degrade the most vulgar tradesman in the opinion 
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of all his neighbors" (ibid., 173). For Smith, therefore, regulating oneself-exer-
cising self-command-is of paramount importance. Not surprisingly, he regards 
self-command as the preeminent individual moral virtue, one from which "all 
the other virtues seem to derive their principal lustre" (1982, 241). 
Friedman echoes the Stoic character of Smith's views when he admonishes 
managers to exercise self-restraint while running businesses for shareholders. 
He challenges them to be unselfish agents of the owners and to refrain from 
diverting business resources toward activities that earn economic rent for man-
agers- such as endeavors that boost short-term profits and executive bonuses 
at the expense of long-term productivity and profit (Grant 1991 , 911 ). Friedman 
thus espouses pro tit seeking but does not advocate greed. Rather, consistent with 
Smith, Friedman enjoins managers to stand firm against passions that would 
tempt them away from fulfi lling the fundamental fiduciary duties associated 
with the principal-agent agreement and from conforming to society's legal and 
eth ical norms. 
Asymmetric Information and the Subtlety 
of Ethical Custom 
While Friedman's manager is consistent with Smith's virtuous man at the 
abstract level of duties, is Friedman's thesis consistent at a practical level? 
Are there times when managers ought not to maximize profits? To answer this 
question, consider as an example the CEO of a health maiJltenance organization 
(HMO). This company receives the bulk of its receipts from a third party, such 
as an insurance company, so that consumers and payments are separated by a 
semitransparent penumbra. Suppose a patient visits one of these HMO doctors 
complaining of a backache. The doctor in this situation has many treatment 
options, each entailing a different level of treatment and potential profit for the 
HMO. What should the doctor do? 
According to Friedman's injunction, the CEO's imperative is to advance the 
wishes of the company's shareholders. lf profit maximization is the goal, the CEO 
has a moral obligation to make as much profit as possible so long as no fraud is 
committed. Accordingly, the CEO should command that doctors prescribe the 
procedures, tests, and surgeries that will generate the most profit for the HMO. 
Because backache symptoms indicate a number of possible causes, some of 
which could be serious, the doctor could select the priciest treatment options 
while still not violating the law or ethical customs. Doctors who overtest can 
argue that they are being risk-averse to provide better care or to avoid lawsuits. 
The patient would be inclined to go along with the doctor's treatment regimen 
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because she lacks the doctor's sophisticated knowledge. In doing so, however, 
she and her insurance company will pay an inflated price for treatment of her 
backache. Even so, no laws are broken, and the doctor conforms to society's 
expectation that doctors alleviate patient suffering. 
Exploring the situation fwther, however, it becomes apparent that the CEO's 
promotion of profit maximization is not wholly appropriate. For one, the CEO 
is taking advantage of the patient's ignorance and likely violates the fiduciary 
trust grounding the doctor-patient relationship. The doctor is able to prescribe 
the most expensive course of treatment precisely because of information and 
financial asymmetry and because the patient trusts that the doctor has her best 
interests in mind. Because it is often difficult for buyers to obtain competing 
information in some health-care situations, and the consequences for failing 
to buy may be life-or-death, this transaction can be seen as coercive (Sandel 
I 998). Had the patient the same information and experience as the doctor, and 
were the patient paying directly for the treatment, she would not be as inclined 
to accept the doctor's expensive treatment option. Lacking such knowledge and 
incentives, however, she is exploited by the health-care providers' dictum to 
maximize profits. 
Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow discussed the problem of doctors, asymmetric 
information, and ethics in an early book (1974). Doctors who own medical labs 
or testing equipment have an economic incentive to order tests, and many do so 
at a rate much higher than average (Armstrong 2005). When such moral hazards 
exist, the medical community demands- through an ethical code dating back 
twenty-four hundred years- that its members put patient interests ahead of other 
interests, including those of corporate shareholders. Such a hierarchy of interests 
is ambiguous in practice, of course, and so the characters of the CEO and the 
doctor matter a great deal. In particular, we might examine the CEO motives as a 
basis for analysis. In the case of our backache patient, the CEO must accept that 
doctors-and hence the CEO as well-have fundamentally competing duties. 
Both the doctor and the CEO as business manager must restrain themselves in 
light of the expectations that society has of doctors, whether they are free agents 
or employees of health-care enterprises. 
These two things, the presence of the need of individuals to adhere to duty 
and the necessity of individuals and their employers to acknowledge the expecta-
tions of society, illustrate how Friedman's caveats apply in practical situations. 
They reveal, too, the subjective dimension of what would seem to be an absolute 
application of a free-market requirement to maximize profits. Finally, they show 
how the need to limit profit seeking arises in settings where Jaws are not at issue 
and where the ethical customs of society are open to interpretation. 
225 
Martin Calkins/Jonathan B. Wight 
Analogous situations to the doctor can be found in other disciplines. Accountants, 
lawyers, engineers, journalists, religious leaders, and others have si.m ilar but 
distinctly particular fiduciary standards associated with their vocations.3 In these 
and other endeavors, professionals are duty-bound to relegate profit seeking to 
secondary status. As with the doctor, managers in these disciplines must recognize 
the presence of asymmetric information and hold certain important core values 
above the absolutes of the market.4 Even econometricians have been called upon 
to develop a code of ethics in response to numerous problems of asymmetric 
information in data collection and analysis (Levy and Peart 2008). 
One can surmise that social norms and codes for certain professions arose 
precisely because of issues of client vulnerability. Yet, there are many instances 
of customer vulnerability where professional codes of conduct are absent. Take, 
for example, the situation of a traveler in need of urgent car repair to an isolated 
town with only one service station. A nationwide corporation owns the repair 
station, and the shop manager faces a decision of whether to maxi.mize profits 
for the owners (corporate shareholders) or follow a perceived moral duty to put 
the customer's interests ahead of the company's. To some degree, this problem 
can be handled adequately by enlightened self-interest in the marketplace. The 
car repair shop manager might decide to be honest and not take advantage of the 
customer to thereby promote the corporation's reputation for honesty. In this way, 
the manager could justify favoring the customer's interests on the grounds that 
doing so creates a relationship resulting in greater profits in the long run (Novak 
1990). 5 Accordingly, absent a professional code of conduct, the institution of 
competitive markets itself- through repeat business- can create incentives for 
behavior that conform to ethical standards, even if the motives for action are 
avaricious (Smith 1981 ; McCloskey 2006). 
Relying upon the consequentialist incentive of enlightened self-interest to 
handle all problems of moral hazard is problematical. This is the case, for example, 
when sellers do not anticipate repeat business, when buyers themselves are not 
responsible for paying (e.g., third-party insurance payers), and when providers 
can sustain asymmetric information and lack of transparency. It can also occw· 
when managers' bonuses are tied to short-term rather than long-term goals. In 
such situations, greed can lead to free riding and inefficiency that can be sub-
stantial in certain industries (health care, for one). Resolving such problems is 
not easy, but Friedman and Smith provide fairly consistent arguments at both the 
theoretical and the practical levels to advocate for market principles restricted 
by compelling individual duties and social customs. 
Smith and Friedman differ greatly, however, in their attempts to explain the 
complex human behaviors that provide a rationale for moral duties. For his part, 
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Sm ith offers a nuanced account in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1982) for 
how society inculcates young people in concepts of duty and virtue so that, as 
adults, they might come to acquire self-control. This socialization process relies 
upon the cultivation of mutual sympathy ("fellow-feeling") that is genuinely 
felt. lt demands that self-interest be constrained and often superseded by other 
motives. 
In many ways, Smith's model individual is similar to Friedman's, but a key 
distinction is with Friedman's ethical framework. Smith is a virtue ethicist who 
argues (with Hume) that although ethical behavior produces good consequences, 
the foundation for ethical behavior lies in the emotional connections of individu-
als rather than in rational calculations of enlightened self-interest. 
Not unlike Aristotle and other of his predecessors, Smith holds virtue to be its 
own reward. Sm ith states, "Sympathy ... cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a 
selfish principle" ( 1982, 317). Smith's moral sentiments model can then readily 
explain how and why an economic actor could behave with duty to customers, 
even in cases of one-time interactions and with pervasive asymmetric informa-
tion, that is, in cases in which enlightened self-interest breaks down. 
Friedman's model cannot do the same, and his ideal manager, we will see, is 
logically inconsistent. According to Friedman, business executives are bound 
by the principal-agent relationship to operate in a deontological or duty-based 
ethical manner up the chain of command with their superiors and shareholders. 
Simultaneously, they are to pursue a purely consequentialist striving to maxi-
mize profits and to disallow intrusions into their conduct such as Smith's moral 
sympathy. Managers thereby face a moral dilemma. Tfthey accept the notion that 
deontological moral duties should guide behavior, and if deontological moral 
duties require that everyone be treated in the same manner, then prefen·ing one 
group (shareholders) over other stakeholders on purely consequentialist grounds 
is morally untenable. How can this be resolved? Terry Price (2008) addresses 
the question using Kantian logic, but the result may be difficult to generalize 
and apply in practical situations. 
In addition, it is also unclear in Friedman's argument how and why managers 
come to acquire fidelity to the concept of moral duty in the first place. Friedman 
does not provide an adequate answer and so the logical fallacy in his argument 
is this: that capitalism clearly requires duty-bound managers, but capitalist 
institutions cannot create or sustain the concept of duty. Paul Heyne ( 1995), an 
advocate of markets, succinctly argues this poi_nt: 
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The market requires moral foundations which cannot be created by market 
transactions themselves. Moral foundations are nurtured in communities- in 
f~unilies, neighborhoods, religious fel lowships, local political associations, 
and other voluntary groups. By fostering the steady disintegration of these 
communities, market transactions may tend over time to undermine the moral 
foundations upon which they rest. 
This is the first lacuna in Friedman's concept of the manager- that manag-
ers must be duty-bound to shareholders but cannot be duty-bound to customers, 
workers, suppliers, and other stakeholders. The important exception is ifprofits 
can be enhanced by appearing to be duty-bound to other stakeholders, that is, 
to appear morally committed to social concerns if doing so enhances commu-
nity relations, worker efforts, and so on. Managers thus have a dualistic ethical 
personality. 
This duality at the level of theory suggests a second and practical feature 
of Friedman 's argument: Managers are morally authentic when responding up 
the chain of command but possibly deliberately inauthentic when manipulat-
ing down the corporate hierarchy (as long as no moral norms are broken). The 
second lacuna in Friedman's concept of the manager then reveals how Smith 
and he diverge at an instrumental level. While both see ethics as achieving some 
beneficial outcomes, Smith's concept of the ethical person is fundamentally 
nonconsequentialist. Smith uses a virtue-based behavioral model, incorporat-
ing intuitions and emotions to study human motivations, while Friedman relies 
more upon consequentialist calculations of self-interest and a loose deontology 
to establish the duties of managers to corporate shareholders. 
Profits and Motivation 
In his Nobel Prize address, Douglass North (1994) argued that neoclassical 
economics is a poor vehicle for understanding the development of markets 
because it generally ignores the role of institutions and path dependencies over 
time. Similarly, Kenneth Arrow observed of doctors, institutions, and ethics 
that, "one might regard professional ethics as an example of an institution which 
fills in some measure the gap created by the conesponding failure of the price 
system" (Arrow 1974, 36-37). Both comments illustrate aspects of Friedman 's 
model, which is that it is arguably helpful in identifYing the instrumental role 
of managers but inadequate for understanding the motives and full range of 
managers' duties.6 
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Friedman 's model is limited for one because he argues that maximizing profits 
should direct the manager's activities without explain ing the reasons for profit 
maximizing being the single and best motivator for managers and entrepreneurs. 
The notion that profit is or should be the overarching motivator is problematic 
for several reasons. First, it contradicts a common understanding and empirical 
research about the ways successful business leaders actually motivate in prac-
tice. A slew of management and leadership literature indicates that managers 
and entrepreneurs are not motivated primarily by profit maximizing (Adams 
1984; Hawken 1987; Osterberg 1993; Ray and Rinzler 1993; Ray and Renesch 
1994; Peale, Blanchard, and Peale 1996; Harmen and Porter 1997; Blanchard 
1997; and Ffeffer 1998). Rather, they are inspired by ideas and ideals related 
to an enterprise. 
Second and following from the first point, Friedman's model fails as an 
explanation for manager motivation because it relies on a neoclassical econom ic 
model ill-designed to provide such explanation. The neoclassical economic model 
is a black box containing virtually no behavioral information about the psycho-
logical sources of meaning. It explains well how businesses become efficient at 
generating profits but does not account for the motives that drive individuals to 
produce those profits. lt can explain, for example, how F. W. Taylor's scientific 
management's time studies, standardization, and mechanical view of manage-
ment can increase efficiency to generate higher profits in business, but it cannot 
account for the drive, creativity, and circumspection that impel individuals to build 
successful instinttions. Moreover, it does not explain the fundamenta l reasons 
for engaging the process in the first place. It simply explains process without 
reflecting on the merit of the activity. Tt is vulnerable therefore to criticisms such 
as Peter Drucker's, who reputedly said, "There is nothing so useless as doing 
efficiently that which should not be done at all" (Office of federa l Procurement 
Policy, 2004, 16). 
Third, Friedman's model is inadequate because there are so many better alter-
natives to it. A more helpful approach, for example, can be found in the recent 
intellectual history of entrepreneurship, which explains a wide range of managerial 
motivations (Kalantaridis 2004). Here, we find how profit is a central concern 
for managers (especially entrepreneurs) but not the only or even main source of 
meaning and motivation. Rather, managers and risk-taking mavericks tend to be 
motivated by the desire to achieve, build, ovettake competitors, produce the best, 
be first to market, or attain some self-actualizing goal or set of goals. Rivalry, for 
one, is a potent motivator. As Adam Smith noted, rivaLry and emulation, spurred 
by competition, is usually sufficient to induce "the very greatest exertions" (1 981 , 
760). Such rivalry, as David McCleland argues in The Achieving Society (1961), 
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is spurred by the desire to excel and is a psychological process and not simply 
a desire for a specific outcome, such as maximizing profits. 
Other, more anecdotal observations support Smith's and McCieland's argu-
ments. For example, John Kay's sample of twentieth-century innovations-DNA, 
computing, antibiotics, television, and the green revolution in agriculture-illus-
trates how "financial incentives play ... only a small part [in their discovery], 
and the financial rewards for the discoverers were not great. ... The principal 
motives appear to be the excitement of the process of discovery, and the social 
rewards offered to the renowned scientist" (2004a, 268). Even Donald Trump 
admits that, "Money was never a big motivator for me, except as a way to keep 
score. The real excitement is playing the game" (BrainyQuote ). Motivating goals 
can even relate to transpersonal or altruistic objectives. Frank (2004, 79), for 
example, found that workers in companies with "socially responsible" profiles 
were willing to accept wages far below firms that did not. In the end then, a wide 
range of other explanations supersede Friedman's model as an explanation of 
manager motivation. 
FoUith, Friedman's model does not account for the inspirational sentiments 
underlying managerial motives to maxin1ize profits. Although he suggests that 
enlightened self-interest motivates managers to maximize profits, managers might 
just as easily adopt a pretense of such sentiments to mask their greed. In such 
circumstances, a savvy (but cynical) manager might even promote the goals of 
corporate social responsibility in the hope that these might increase productivity, 
customer loyalty, and ultimately ... profits. This sort of approach is not farfetched. 
It befits the modus operandi of many "opportunistic pseudo-transfon11ational 
leader(s)" observed by Terry Price (2003, 72). 
Adam Smith's model ofbebavioral psychology, in contrast, provides a clearer 
rationale for the moral sentiments empowering responsible business practices. 
For Smith, the natural sentiment of sympathy (fellow-feeling) is the source of 
moral vutue that "cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a selfish principle" ( 1982, 
317). In practice, it engenders caution and truthfulness. The reason for this is 
simple- because people are adept at discerning the feelings of others similar 
to themselves, they can detect deceit. Accordingly, "the prudent man is always 
sincere, and fee ls horror at the very thought of exposing himself to the disgrace 
which attends upon the detection offalsehood" (Smith 1982, 214 ). Although 
exceptions in the form of superb emotional fakers do exist, it is difficult for 
most people to sustain emotional fictions. Most can intuit when another (for our 
purposes, a manager) says something he or she does not really believe, and the 
resulting punishment of alienation and disgust when individuals are caught in 
deception is usually sufficient to minimize widespread hypocrisy. 
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Having established the reasons and supp011 for fellow-feeling and honesty, 
Smith goes on to note that ambitious people frequently do not know for certain 
what they are pursuing. Their objectives are bound up within a social context 
so that acceptance and status among their peers becomes their strongest desire 
( 1982, 213). As Smith notes: " It is not ease or pleasure, but always honour, of 
one kind or another, though frequently an honour very ill understood, that the 
ambitious man really pursues" ( 1982, 65, emphasis added). When placed in the 
context of business, this means that managers learn to generate profit for the 
sake of survival (their own and their firm's), but this is not to say that they are 
motivated by profit per se or that they operate best from a psychological perspec-
tive in which profit maximization is at the center. 
Fifth and finally, Friedman's model not only fails to account for certain 
inspirational sentiments, it also fai ls to recognize the importance of .intuition in 
motivation. Here, Frank Knight's Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921) is particu-
larly helpful to an understanding of the role of intuition in management and, in 
particular, to transfonnational leadership. In Knight's view, risk is an attribute 
of a business project for which reasonably well-known probabilities exist. If 
insurance markets are deep enough, for example, one can buy policies to protect 
against virtually any risk. Uncertainty, on the other hand, is a situation in which 
not enough information exists to make reasonable assessments of probability. 
No amount of planning or logical assessment can resolve the uncertainty and so 
no insurance can be bought to offset its hazards. ln environments of uncertainty, 
intuition may be a vital input in production (Kay 2004a, 2004b ). As Trump reflects: 
"Experience taught me a few things. One is to listen to your gut, no matter how 
good something sounds on paper" (BrainyQuote). 
lf it is true that intuition and emotion (right-brain functions) are sometimes of 
greater use to managers than logical, cost-benefit calculations (left-brain func-
tions), then managers may need to develop imagination, spontaneity, curiosity, 
creativity, and connectivity-all forms of moral imagination-a topic to be 
addressed next (Goleman 1995, Elster 1998). 
Obliquity and Organizational Transformation 
While most contemporary management theorists acknowledge Smith's and 
Friedman's theories as helpful, these and other early m icroeconomic theories are 
thought to be overly narrow and limited. They consequently have been largely 
replaced with approaches that are more expansive and holistic. 
John Kay, corporate consultant and former business school dean at Oxford 
University, proffers one such new approach that emphasizes "obliquity." Here, Kay 
argues that the best way to reach a profit objective is not always to head directly 
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for it but to approach it from the side, that is, obliquely. Such an approach is prefer-
able in dynamic situations where systems are "complex, imperfectly understood, 
and change their nature as we engage with them" (Kay 2004b ). The approach is 
especially helpful in multifaceted, interdependent business organizations where, 
typically, there is no single, simple, and correct strategy for running operations. 
In these dynamic situations-whether the industry is new or mature, has adopted 
technology slowly or quickly, is publicly or privately held, has extensive or weak 
government regulations, is led by a founding entrepreneur or hired managers, has 
low or high margins- managers must balance a variety of competing internal and 
external demands to resolve problems. While Friedman's simple admonishment 
to maximize profits has an important place in this environment, it is certainly 
not an exclusive prescription for business development. 
Kay recognizes the limits of traditional direct approaches to management prob-
lems and goes on to explain that managers who focus on the simple, well-defined 
objective ofprofit maximization often fail miserably. They make the mistake, 
in his view, of "underestimating the complexity of the system with which they 
(deal) and the value of the traditional knowledge they (inherit)" (ibid.). A better 
approach, he believes, is one that provides managers with a holistic perspective 
of the corporation; that is, one that enables managers to adapt to and succeed 
in a changing world. To buttress his point, Kay observes how few neoclassical 
microeconomists are hired by businesses. This, he suggests, is partly because 
microeconomic theorists rely on simplistically direct, ahistorical approaches that 
do not account for the path-dependent nature of evolutionary business enterprises. 
Further, the standard model fails to portray adequately the complex psychological 
incentives that motivate today's managers. 
The paucity of the standard model that Kay describes high I ights not just the 
limits of microeconomic theory but also the failure of economists to account 
for one of the theory's central tenets-Smith's notion of sympathy. Sympathy 
or fellow-feeling is critical to good management, for by it, "we place ourselves 
in [another's) situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same tonnents, 
we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person 
with him " ( 1982, 9). Sympathy forms the basis of moral imagination and enables 
managers to deeply understand and appreciate the employees, investors, suppliers, 
customers, and other stakeholders crucial to the success of commercial enterprises 
(Werhane 1999; Moberg and Seabright2000). While number crunching skills and 
consequentialist approaches that emphasize profit maximization are important, 
these alone are insufficient for good management as both today's management 
theorists and Adam Smith recognized. 
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The key points raised here are first, that Smith 's concept of human motiva-
tion does allow for a dominant role to be played by nonpecuniary motives; and 
second, that Smith's approach is based on a nonconsequentialist model of moral 
sentiments that inspires good management. Smith lays out the biological and 
psychological case for human instincts that lead to the formation of moral rules 
and norms (Wight 2007; Evensky 2005). While these moral rules serve useful 
instrwnental purposes, they arise from an intuitive psychology that operates 
through virtue ethics. Given this and within Smith's moral framework, a com-
pany might come to represent the best aspirations of its stakeholders, not just 
financial rewards for its shareholders. Decision-making might reflect a concern 
for creating a process and generating outcomes that uphold self-actualizing 
interests (Hawken 1987). Not unlike Michael Porter and Mark Kramer's notion 
of "building shared values" as an approach to corporate social responsibility, 
managers might generate loyalty and efficiency that more than compensate for 
the company's costs (Porter and Kramer 2006, 13). 
Conclusion 
This article challenges Friedman's doctrine that the pursuit of profit is and shou ld 
be the manager's exclusive duty. As shown here, Friedman 's thesis based on 
arguments of commutative justice, freedom, and economic efficiency does not 
claim that managers are relieved from the constraints of civil and moral laws. 
To the contrary, his argument maintains that ethical precepts delimit and create 
the foundation for ethical business practices and markets. Friedman's notion 
of profit maximization, in sh01t, is not synonymous with selfish individualism. 
Rather, it advocates consideration of others and self-restraint or, in Adam Smith's 
terminology, sympathy (fellow-feeling) and self-command. 
Friedman's argument does, however, raise a logical contradiction. Because 
moral tenets come as bundles of duties and obligations- often impossible to 
untangle- they cannot be resolved through simple f01mulae or defined in tem1s 
of profit motivation. Some motive or set of motives other than profit maximi-
zation is necessaty, and sometimes these other motives can conflict with the 
profit motive. A business manager, for example, who believes it is her duty to be 
loyal to the owners' interests, might also believe it is her moral duty to tell the 
truth-even if doing so might lower profits. James and Rassekh (2000, 671, f2) 
rep01t that Friedman, in a personal communication, agreed that in such a situ-
ation, truth telling to outsiders was a moral obligation of the business manager 
even if this lowered shareholders' profits. Tllis patticular example arose in the 
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specific context of threatened third-party property rights that, to Friedman, might 
represent a core human right on par with freedom. 
For Friedman, the ·fiduciary aspect of the principal-agent agreement is para-
mount; hence, honesty is a critical vittue. Honesty is not, however, the only moral 
vittue relevant to managers, and these other moral vittues become apparent in 
practice. A manager might easily find him or herself in a position of having to 
decide, for example, whether or not to uphold shareholder interests when doing so 
threatens the selfish personal interests of the manager. He or she might also have 
to decide about whether or not to tell the truth (a form of honesty) when doing so 
could jeopardize the interests of employees, suppliers, and other stakeholders. In 
these sorts of situations, relying exclusively upon the principal-agent agreement, 
the moral virtue of honesty, and profit maximization is unhelpful. Other values 
and virtues are necessary. Friedman 's fonnula does not account for these and 
effectively boxes-in managers, forcing them to be only consequentialist in their 
dealings with stakeholders. This is Friedman 's first major gap or lacuna. 
Friedman's second lacuna involves his insistence on profit maximization 
at the expense of itnp01tant motivational issues in management. While the 
pursuit of self-actualizing incentives that increase worker loyalty, motivation, 
and efficiency would be accepted by Friedman under the rubric of enlightened 
self-interest, his requirement that managers calculate the expected gains and 
losses from having such nonpecuniaty drives and then pretend to possess them 
undermines the strength and efficacy of the approach. Such a consequentialist 
reckoning ultimately fails to recognize the genuine relationships of managers as 
well as the authentic sympathy and passion (Smith 's fellow-feeling) that inspire 
managers, workers, and customers. Hence, this tactic fails to account for moral 
imagination-a construct that cannot be conjured up along narrowly rational 
and self-interested grounds. 
Given these shmtcomings and to offset these lacunae, this article supports a 
subtler version of Friedman's directive. It acknowledges that profit maximiza-
tion using all legal and ethical means remait1s an insightful model of resource 
allocation. It proffers, however, that this metagoal can at times be achieved 
obliquely by placing other objectives ahead of profit. For example, cultivating 
a genuine virtue ethic (as in Adam Smith) may achieve this goal, but not in a 
purely consequentialist manner. ln this way, it is hoped, the manager might have 
a focused, yet more consistently authentic and humane, moral framework to 
guide his or her behavior. 
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I. Friedman observes that tax laws may mitigate against this because of the double 
taxation of corporate profits. 
2. Adam Smith is equally cynical: " I have never known much good done by those 
who affected to trade for the public good" (1981, 456). Smith is referring here to 
merchants who profess to care for society's interests when they are really lobbying 
for legislation that would earn them economic rent (e.g., through protectionism). 
Friedman's point is analogous. 
3. Here, vocation is regarded as a response to a calling. 
4. \>Vhat exactly are these absolute laws or institutional rules? Friedman provides only 
one example, that of the widespread acceptance of wages in a market system based 
on individual productivity. One can think of many others, such as the widespread 
acceptance of the legitimacy offairly elected govenm1ents and the widespread adher-
ence to moral injunctions against theft. rt should be clear that transaction costs in 
exchange would be much higher in the absence of widespread acceptance of basic 
social norms of morality. 
5. Michael Novak makes this distinction: " [T]here is a difference between maximiza-
tion of profit and optimization of profit. To aim at maximizing profit-that is, to 
obtain the greatest profit possible out of every opportunity-is to be greedy in the 
present at the expense of the future .... By contrast, to optimize profit is to take many 
other factors besides profit into account, including long-term investment, consumer 
loyalty, and the sense of a fair service for a fair price" ( 1990, 51). 
6. R. Edward Freeman argues similarly against approaches that take a "narrow economic 
view of business," here in tern1s of criticisms ofWal-Mart (2006). 
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